geopolitics – Militant Futurist

April 30, 2020

Mapping the Global Future 2020

“The process of globalization, powerful as it is, could be substantially slowed or even stopped. Short of a major global conflict, which we regard as improbable, another large-scale development that we believe could stop globalization would be a pandemic…”

That is probably the most chillingly prescient passage from Mapping the Global Future, a report written 16 years ago by experts working for the U.S. National Intelligence Council, describing coming developments in geopolitics, culture, technology, and the economy out to 2020. With the year in question having arrived, I thought it was worthwhile to review the accuracy of it’s predictions, and overall, I was impressed. Mapping the Global Future correctly identified most of the megatrends that shaped the world from 2004-20, (though it was somewhat less accurate forecasting the degrees to which those factors would change things):

No significant expansion or strengthening of liberal democracy. From 2004-20, for every Myanmar there was a Turkey, and the number of “real” democracies across the world didn’t significantly change. Contrast this to the 15 years preceding the report’s publication, in which communism fell in Europe and Central Asia, along with many dictatorships in Latin America and Africa. The report’s authors correctly gauged that conditions were not ripe for another wave of international democratization.
Solid growth of global economy. The report failed to predict the Great Recession, but so did all other experts. Nevertheless, report’s estimate that the 2020 gross world product (GWP) would be 80% larger than it was in 2000 was very close to being right: it actually rose by 74% (adjusted for inflation).
Massive growth in China, and to a lesser extent, India. This was not the hardest prediction to make, though it should be noted that a minority of foreign policy experts in 2004 thought China might fall apart by 2020, probably thanks to political problems. I think the extent to which China’s growth (economic, military, technological, average living standards) ended up surpassing India’s would have surprised the authors.
Little or no weakening of Islamic extremism and terrorism. At this moment, there is a relative lull in the level of violence, but just three years ago, ISIS was at its peak, and nothing is stopping an “ISIS-level” resurgence of Islamic violence (Africa is likeliest to be the next hotbed). While the U.S. has dodged a sequel to 9/11, the total number of people killed worldwide by Muslim fanatics might actually be higher now than it was in 2004. The conditions that gave rise to Islamic terrorism in 2004 still exist in large parts of the world. Finally, the report made the frighteningly accurate predictions that al Qaeda would be replaced by new terrorist groups (ISIS and Boko Haram), and that the formation of an Islamic caliphate spanning multiple countries was even possible.
Very low likelihood of war between the great powers. Russia, China, and the U.S. didn’t even come close to fighting. A lot of ink has been spilled since 2004 about accidents–like U.S. and Russian planes shooting each other down over Syria–spiraling into all-out war, but I think cooler heads would have prevailed.
Weakening of U.S. global supremacy. The report correctly predicted that the U.S. would still be the world’s strongest country overall in 2020, but the gap between it and its nearest competitors–chiefly China–would be narrower. It was also right to forecast the weakening of the U.S.-led international banking and trade system.
Backlash against globalization and concomitant rise of populism and nationalism. From the election of Donald Trump, to Brexit, to the breakdown of the Doha Free Trade talks and the Trans-Pacific Partnership, to near-constant angst over the erosion of the middle class due to outsourcing and illegal immigrant laborers, to the rise of chauvinist strongmen across the world, we see clear proof of these trends. The struggle between liberal globalists and conservative nationalists became THE cultural and political fissure during the 2004-20 time frame.
Major impact of internet on culture, self-identity, business, and other aspects of life. As the report predicted, the expansion of the internet to most of the human race has empower global movements like the Arab Spring, fragmented and upended the news media landscape, and facilitated the rise of more complex human identities and group loyalties that transcend national borders, making national governance and consensus-forming harder.
World vulnerability to pandemic. This isn’t explored in great detail, but the report makes it clear that the threat of a pandemic bad enough to halt globalization is real.

Of course, the report also had a few failed predictions and omissions, which are important to mention, but in my opinion, outweighed by what the report got right:

Didn’t foresee the Great Recession. I noted this before, and also how it had little effect on the report’s accuracy forecasting 2000-2020 global wealth growth. The report’s authors were also in good company, since no expert in 2004 predicted the Great Recession.
Didn’t foresee fracking. While the report doesn’t predict anything as calamitous as the world running out of oil by 2020, it says that oil prices could be significantly higher than they were in 2004 due to tighter supplies, leading to the usual fare of anxieties, political problems, and small-scale wars. Had fracking not been invented, this could well have been the case. Fracking has revolutionized the global energy landscape by boosting oil and natural gas supplies well beyond what almost all energy experts thought possible in 2004. More than anything, this failure should highlight the perils of trying to predict the future of the energy markets.
Didn’t foresee Venezuela’s near-implosion (could it still happen?). To be fair, Venezuela’s economy collapsed because their socialist government badly managed its oil industry after nationalizing it and because fracking then caused a sharp drop in world oil prices. The report’s experts couldn’t have foreseen how bad the mismanagement would get, and as noted, they also didn’t predict the rise of fracking.
Thought North Korea would “come to a head.” It’s unclear what the report’s authors were envisioning here (North Korea democratization? North Korea chaotic implosion? One Korea–possibly with the help of a superpower ally–annexing the other?), other than the status quo of a divided Korean peninsula with a hostile dictatorship in the North ending by 2020. That didn’t happen, and it’s crucial to remember that there’s a clear and now long-running pattern of “experts” making wrong predictions about this. (https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2012/08/the-long-history-of-wrongly-predicting-north-koreas-collapse/260769/) It raises the possibility that North Korea could continue to endure for much longer than we expect, in spite of the reports of how brittle and strange the regime is and how desperate its citizens are.
Thought Taiwan would “come to a head.” The authors surely meant either a successful Taiwanese declaration of independence or annexation to China (probably by force). This also didn’t happen, and can also be added to the long list of wrong predictions about this issue.
Russia predictions were not great, not terrible. While the report’s authors correctly predicted that corruption, lack of foreign investment, population shrinkage, conflicts with its neighbors would leave Russia “stuck in neutral” in terms of absolute power and declining in terms of relative global stature, they didn’t predict how badly relations would deteriorate with the West, and foresaw Central Asia as Russia’s likeliest battleground when in fact it was Ukraine and the Caucuses. My guess is that they underestimated how skillful of a leader Putin would turn out to be, and also underestimated the Russians’ resolve to not let any more of their satellite states slip away to the Western camp.
Overestimated the risks of bioterrorism and nuclear terrorism. Contrary to the report’s fears, no terrorists have used, or to our knowledge obtained, biological or nuclear weapons since 2004. Overestimating the threat is understandable given the contemporaneous problem of loose Russian nuclear weapons and widespread fear of and misinformation about bioterrorism following the 2001 Anthrax Attacks. Russia’s recovery from the chaotic 1990s allowed them to secure all of their nuclear weapons, and biological weapons are actually much harder to create and successfully use than popular fiction and biased “experts” who got most of the attention around 2004 led the public to believe. (Note: Unfortunately, I think weaponized COVID-19 could make bioterrorism much likelier)

Thinking about what the expert authors of Mapping the Global Future got right and wrong leads me to following general conclusions about the course of world events, and about making predictions:

The status quo is strong. Slow, plodding megatrends and entrenched systems are very resistant to change, regardless of how outdated, suboptimal, or undesirable they may be. The fact that hand-wringing and doomsaying about issues like the divided Korean peninsula, contested status of Taiwan, unsustainable European welfare states, American global primacy, and nation-state model has been going on for decades without resolution should give us pause whenever we hear someone predict a shift in some paradigm. The “inevitability” of another American Civil War is a good example. The stodgy status quo is probably stronger and more resilient to shocks than you think, can ruthlessly destroy upstarts, and might be able to use little reforms to muddle its way through some problem that was widely believed to be unsolvable and fatal.
Some dictatorships are smart. Though the report was upbeat about China’s prospects, if anything, it underestimated how strong the country and its regime would become by 2020. China has of course averted collapse, and its communist government has skillfully suppressed democracy and ethnic minority discontent. In short, the dictatorship proved smarter and more competent than even most experts thought in 2004. The use of technology for mass surveillance will entrench it even more in the future. The report’s authors would also have been surprised at how nimble and strong of a leader Putin proved to be, and how well he’s played his country’s diminished hand on the world stage.
Not everyone is ready for democracy. The report correctly recognized that conditions were not right for significant expansions of liberal democracy from 2004-20. The disappointing results of the democratization experiments the U.S. ran in Afghanistan and Iraq, the failure of the Arab Spring, and the rise–with majority voter support–of populist strongmen across the world have been valuable, if painful, reminders that not every group of people is ready for or wants liberal democracy. Growing political dysfunction in the U.S. is also damaging the brand.
Rational actors are in charge and they suck the fun out of everything. The hard truth is that every major country, including the U.S., China, Russia, and even North Korea, is led by a rational actor–or, more accurately, by groups of people who cancel out each other’s worst ideas so that the resulting consensus decisions are adequately rational and informed. They all have an accurate grasp of the world and of their own interests, and base their key decisions on cost-benefit calculations, which is why North Korea doesn’t invade the South, China doesn’t invade Taiwan, the U.S. and Russia don’t start WWIII, etc.
Expert views are good, and usually better than non-experts, but never perfect. As I wrote earlier, I was impressed with the overall accuracy of the report’s predictions, and think the things they got right in aggregate outweigh the things they got wrong. The report’s accuracy probably owes mostly to the fact that it solicited views from “25 leading outside experts from a wide variety of disciplines and backgrounds to engage in a broad-gauged discussion with Intelligence Community analysts.” In other words, experts were invited to make predictions about things in their areas of expertise, which is Rule #1 in my Rules for Good Futurism.

In conclusion, I enjoyed this report and think the authors used a sound methodology for making future predictions. As a result, I’m planning to write a blog analysis of the latest sequel, the DNI’s 2017 Global trends: Paradox of progress, which predicts world events out to 2035.

If you’re interested in learning more about the 2020 report, read my notes on it below and key quotes I copied (which I’ve organized by country and subject), or read the report in full.

Global-Trends_Mapping-the-Global-Future-2020-Project Download

The U.S.

“The United States, too, will see its relative power position eroded, though it will remain in 2020 the most important single country across all the dimensions of power.” Yes, but an easy prediction to make.

“While no single country looks within striking distance of rivaling US military power by 2020…” Right.

“US dependence on foreign oil supplies also makes it more vulnerable as the competition for secure access grows and the risks of supply side disruptions increase.” Missed fracking! Also mentioned this in a non-U.S. section: “Thus sharper demand-driven competition for resources, perhaps accompanied by a major disruption of oil supplies, is among the key uncertainties.”

East and South Asia.

Right about rapid growth in China and India. Report correctly predicted that China would grow faster than India from 2005-20. Size of that gap might have surprised them. Not a good idea to constantly mention “China and India” together.

Predictions about huge growth in China’s middle class, overall purchasing power, and standards of living (like car ownership levels and frequency of overseas travel) were right.

“Meanwhile, the crisis over North Korea is likely to come to a head sometime over the next 15 years.” Another in a long history of failed predictions about its collapse.

“The possession of chemical, biological, and/or nuclear weapons by Iran and North Korea and the possible acquisition of such weapons by others by 2020 also increase the potential cost of any military action by the US against them or their allies.” North Korea did first nuclear test in October 2006. Iran has been dissuaded thanks to hardball diplomacy and direct intervention (nuclear computer virus, assassinations of leading people)–for now.

“By 2020, globalization could be equated in the popular mind with a rising Asia, replacing its current association with Americanization.” Accurate. The U.S. is retrenching under Trump, but China’s global reach is still expanding through its Belt and Road Initiative (created in 2013) and other large investments in Africa and almost everywhere else.

“What Would An Asian Face on Globalization Look Like?
…Asian finance ministers have considered establishing an Asian monetary fund that would operate along different lines from IMF, attaching fewer strings on currency swaps and giving Asian decision-makers more leeway from the “Washington macro-economic consensus.”” China founded the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank in 2015 as a direct rival to the IMF.
…An expanded Asian-centric cultural identity may be the most profound effect of a rising Asia. Asians have already begun to reduce the percentage of students who travel to Europe and North America with Japan and—most striking—China becoming educational magnets. A new, more Asian cultural identity is likely to be rapidly packaged and distributed as incomes rise and communications networks spread. Korean pop singers are already the rage in Japan, Japanese anime have many fans in China, and Chinese kung-fu movies and Bollywood song-and-dance epics are viewed throughout Asia. Even Hollywood has begun to reflect these Asian influences—an effect that is likely to accelerate through 2020.” U.S. pop culture still reigns supreme globally, and in spite of spending huge amounts of money, China has had little success making films, music, or other cultural products that outsiders like. However, China’s influence has grown anyway, and disturbing examples include the recent, high-profile instances of China pressuring U.S. sports and entertainment companies to self-censor.

“The regional experts felt that the possibility of major inter-state conflict remains higher in Asia than in other regions. In their view, the Korean Peninsula and Taiwan Strait crises are likely to come to a head by 2020, risking conflict with global repercussions. At the
same time, violence within Southeast Asian states—in the form of separatist insurgencies and terrorism—could intensify. China also could face sustained armed unrest from separatist movements along its western borders.” The crises did not come to a head! Important to pay attention to these failed predictions. Maybe they’ll continue to fail forever, and there will not be violent resolutions to Korea and Taiwan (expert predictions about inevitable U.S.-Soviet war were also wrong). The insurgency in Xinjiang did worsen, but China crushed it with martial law and reeducation camps. Russians also crushed Chechen insurgency. Sad testimony about the effectiveness of government repression? Even more effective in the future thanks to mass surveillance tech?

“Asia is particularly important as an engine for change over the next 15 years…Both the Korea and Taiwan issues are likely to come to a head, and how they are dealt with will be important factors shaping future US-Asia ties as well as the US role in the region…Japan’s position in the region is also likely to be transformed as it faces the challenge of a more independent security role.” None of that happened. Japan never transitioned from its isolationist, defensive posture to an international role that was more active and independent of the U.S. Japan’s alliance with the U.S. remains its most important and defining interstate relationship.

“China and India, which lack adequate domestic energy resources, will have to ensure continued access to outside suppliers; thus, the need for energy will be a major factor in shaping their foreign and defense policies, including expanding naval power.
…Beijing’s growing energy requirements are likely to prompt China to increase its activist role in the world—in the Middle East, Africa, Latin America, and Eurasia. In trying to maximize and diversify its energy supplies, China worries about being vulnerable to pressure from the United States which Chinese officials see as having an aggressive energy policy that can be used against Beijing.” Correct. A big reason for the Belt and Road Initiative is to secure oil and gas supply lines from the Middle East and Central Asia to China. China also launched its first aircraft carrier in 2012 and has sharply expanded and improved its navy since then. While some worry the navy is being built up to take over Taiwan, its equally important purpose will be to protect the oil shipping lanes that run from the Persian Gulf to China’s coast.

China’s sex ratio imbalance has not caused major problems as the report suggested might happen. Again, China proved more stable and its government more able to deal with problems than outsiders worried.

Report’s hopes of China taking steps towards democracy were dashed. Instead, Chinese government has effectively placated its populace with economic growth, security, and propagandization. China’s success has put forth what might be a viable political / economic / social alternative to Western liberal democracy, and I believe the former’s appeal is one reason why global democratization has slowed. Dictators see there is another way.

The report calculates that, in spite of China’s rapid economic growth, it will take decades before it gets rich enough to emerge from the ranks of “middle income” countries: In 2050, per capita Chinese GDP will only equal per capita GDP in Western countries in 2004. This will probably prove true, but remember that life wasn’t bad for us Westerners in 2004 (I clearly remember it!). Raising the average standard of living for people in a country of 1.4 billion to 2004 American standards will be a monumental accomplishment. Also note that this economic forecast for 2050 is in line with my own prediction about China in the 2060s: “China will effectively close the technological, military, and standard of living gaps with other developed countries. Aside from the unpleasantness of being a more crowded place, life in China won’t be worse overall than life in Japan or the average European country.”

Former USSR

“The so-called “third wave” of democratization may be partially reversed by 2020—particularly among the states of the former Soviet Union and in Southeast Asia, some of which never really embraced democracy.” It happened. The Baltic states remain firmly democratic, Ukraine is a dysfunctional democracy where life is bad for most people, and all the others are undemocratic. Also, in SE Asia, Thailand democracy failed but Myanmar’s blossomed. No overall trend.

Correctly predicted that Russia would be stuck in neutral thanks to demographic decline, corruption, lack of foreign investment, and problems with its neighbors. However, incorrectly predicted that the conflicts would be with its Central Asian neighbors and about radical Islam, when in fact Russia fought with Ukraine and Georgia over geopolitics. (Not the only set of experts from that era who worried about Central Asian stability. Were they all fundamentally wrong, or has the problem just been delayed thanks to luck or some other temporary factor?) Russia’s relations with West got much worse than the report predicted thanks to the latter not tolerating the aggression. The report seems to have underestimated how fast Russia would recover from the torpor of the 90s, and its determination to not let more satellite states slip away to the West.

“In the view of the experts, Central Asian states are weak, with considerable potential for religious and ethnic conflict over the next 15 years. Religious and ethnic movements could have a destabilizing impact across the region.” Hasn’t happened…yet. Broader trend I’m seeing is underestimation of how powerful and competent secular dictatorships are at stamping out dissent. Look at failure of Arab Spring, particularly how it was crushed in Bahrain, and at how the military restored the status quo ante in Egypt. Also note the failure of the Iranian uprisings.

“Eurasia, especially Central Asia and the Caucasus, probably will be an area of growing concern, with its large number of potentially failing states, radicalism in the form of Islamic extremism, and importance as a supplier or conveyor belt for energy supplies to both West and East. The trajectories of these Eurasian states will be affected by external powers such as Russia, Europe, China, India and the United States, which may be able to act as stabilizers. Russia is likely to be particularly active in trying to prevent spillover, even though it has enormous internal problems on its own plate. Farther to the West, Ukraine, Belarus, and Moldova could offset their vulnerabilities as relatively new states by closer association with Europe and the EU.”

“If Russia fails to diversify its economy, it could well experience the petro-state phenomenon of unbalanced economic development, huge income inequality, capital flight, and increased social problems.” It happened. Russians have rallied around Putin, however, and have endured the effects of Western sanctions admirably. Part of this owes to the effectiveness of Russian government propaganda at convincing Russians to suffer for the Putin’s causes. Sounds like the report underestimated him in 2004.

Europe

“The EU, rather than NATO, will increasingly become the primary institution for Europe, and the role which Europeans shape for themselves on the world stage is most likely to be projected through it.” Right!

The report’s skepticism of E.U. army being created by 2020 was justified. Europeans still have serious problems with military cooperation.

“Over the next 15 years, West European economies will need to find several million workers to fill positions vacated by retiring workers. Either European countries adapt their work forces, reform their social welfare, education, and tax systems, and accommodate growing immigrant populations (chiefly from Muslim countries) or they face a period of protracted economic stasis that could threaten the huge successes made in creating a more United Europe.” They didn’t solve the problem, have protracted economic stasis, and have sharply slowed down the creation of a more United Europe.

“The experts felt that the current welfare state is unsustainable and the lack of any economic revitalization could lead to the splintering or, at worst, disintegration of the European Union, undermining its ambitions to play a heavyweight international role.” Brexit!

Latin America

“Populist themes are likely to emerge as a potent political and social force, especially as globalization risks aggravating social divisions along economic and ethnic lines. In parts of Latin America particularly, the failure of elites to adapt to the evolving demands of free markets and democracy probably will fuel a revival in populism and drive indigenous movements, which so far have sought change through democratic means, to consider more drastic means for seeking what they consider their “fair share” of political power and wealth.” Definitely happened.

Report’s short section on Latin America failed to predict Venezuela’s near-implosion.

Muslim world and Islam

“In particular, political Islam will have a significant global impact leading to 2020, rallying disparate ethnic and national groups and perhaps even creating an authority that transcends national boundaries.” This is an eerily accurate description of ISIS. Since the group was mostly destroyed, the overall threat posed by political Islam at this moment is lower today than it was in 2004, though its unclear if conditions will hold.

“The key factors that spawned international terrorism show no signs of abating over the next 15 years. Facilitated by global communications, the revival of Muslim identity will create a framework for the spread of radical Islamic ideology inside and outside the Middle East, including Southeast Asia, Central Asia and Western Europe, where religious identity has traditionally not been as strong.” The problem has stayed overwhelmingly confined to the Middle East and South Asia. Islamic terrorists have staged high-profile attacks in Europe, but the resulting deaths were dwarfed by the number killed in the Middle East and South Asia.

“Democratic progress could gain ground in key Middle Eastern countries, which thus far have been excluded from the process by repressive regimes. Success in establishing a working democracy in Iraq and Afghanistan—and democratic consolidation in Indonesia—would set an example for other Muslim and Arab states, creating pressures for change.” No real success. Iraq and Afghanistan are highly corrupt democracies that would collapse without direct U.S. military support. Tunisia became democratic, but I have doubts about its long-term survival.

“Reports of growing investment by many Middle Eastern governments in developing high-speed information infrastructures, although they are not yet widely available to the population nor well-connected to the larger world, show obvious potential for the spread of democratic—and undemocratic—ideas.” This happened. The Arab Spring was the “social media revolution,” and ISIS spread its crazed ideas, snuff videos, and terrorist training materials via the internet.

“Most of the regions that will experience gains in religious “activists” also have youth bulges, which experts have correlated with high numbers of radical adherents, including Muslim extremists.

Youth bulges are expected to be especially acute in most Middle Eastern and West African countries until at least 2005-2010, and the effects will linger long after.

In the Middle East, radical Islam’s increasing hold reflects the political and economic alienation of many young Muslims from their unresponsive and unrepresentative governments and related failure of many predominantly Muslim states to reap significant economic gains from globalization.

The spread of radical Islam will have a significant global impact leading to 2020, rallying disparate ethnic and national groups and perhaps even creating an authority that transcends national boundaries. Part of the appeal of radical Islam involves its call for a return by Muslims to earlier roots when Islamic civilization was at the forefront of global change. The collective feelings of alienation and estrangement which radical Islam draws upon are unlikely to dissipate until the Muslim world again appears to be more fully integrated into the world economy.”

The report contains a hypothetical 2020 letter between Muslim fanatics discussing the recent rise of an Islamic caliphate in the Sunni regions of Iraq, and its war against Shi’ites and U.S. military forces. The fictitious letter also says the conflict spurred a million Middle Eastern refugees to flee to the Western world. This is a frighteningly accurate description of actual events in the Middle East and Europe during the 2010s.

“We expect that by 2020 al-Qa’ida will be superceded by similarly inspired Islamic extremist groups, and there is a substantial risk that broad Islamic movements akin to al-Qa’ida will merge with local separatist movements.” Excellent prediction. ISIS and Boko Haram meet the description.

Global terrorism and organized crime

“Strong terrorist interest in acquiring chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear weapons increases the risk of a major terrorist attack involving WMD. Our greatest
concern is that terrorists might acquire biological agents or, less likely, a nuclear device, either of which could cause mass casualties. Bioterrorism appears particularly suited to the smaller, better-informed groups. We also expect that terrorists will attempt cyber attacks to disrupt critical information networks and, even more likely, to cause physical damage to information systems.” Terrorists have evidently made no progress on this, though the coronavirus pandemic’s damage will surely inspire terrorists to try harder.

“Over the next 10 to 20 years there is a risk that advances in biotechnology will augment not only defensive measures but also offensive biological warfare (BW) agent development and allow the creation of advanced biological agents designed to target specific systems—human, animal, or crop.” No evidence it happened, though the chaos caused by coronavirus could inspire terrorist groups and crazed individuals to focus on BW. It is possible that Russia, China and other states have used new technology to secretly create deadlier bioweapons. Such weapons programs remain beyond the means of terrorists, but could be supported and concealed by a competent government.

Thankfully, terrorists never got WMDs as the report feared. However, they still wreaked enormous havoc with conventional weapons and tactics–terrorists have killed about 200,000 people since 2004.

“If the growing problem of abject poverty and bad governance in troubled states in Sub-Saharan Africa, Eurasia, the Middle East, and Latin America persists, these areas will become more fertile grounds for terrorism, organized crime, and pandemic disease. Forced migration also is likely to be an important dimension of any downward spiral. The international community is likely to face choices about whether, how, and at what cost to intervene.” Yes, this happened. Muslim fundamentalism like Boko Haram in Africa, Mexican cartels worse than ever, refugee waves going to the U.S. and Europe.

“While vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices will remain popular as asymmetric weapons, terrorists are likely to move up the technology ladder to employ advanced explosives and unmanned aerial vehicles.” Terrorists have tried many times to kill people with UAVs, but been unsuccessful. Our luck won’t hold forever. In 2018, a drone was also used in an attempted assassination of Venezuelan president Maduro.

“We expect that terrorists also will try to acquire and develop the capabilities to conduct cyber attacks to cause physical damage to computer systems and to disrupt critical information networks.” Many small-scale attacks have happened, but we’re still waiting for The Big One. The ability for computer hackers to do things like cause nuclear meltdowns or disable national electric grids has been exaggerated.

“A key cyber battlefield of the future will be the information on computer systems themselves, which is far more valuable and vulnerable than physical systems. New technologies on the horizon provide capabilities for accessing data, either through wireless intercept, intrusion into Internet-connected systems, or through direct access by insiders.” This definitely happened. Since 2004, there have been too many big hacking incidents, in which troves of sensitive data and electronic assets were stolen. Also remember the high-profile data dumps on Wikileaks, including those courtesy of Edward Snowden.

“Organized crime is likely to thrive in resource-rich states undergoing significant political and economic transformation, such as India, China, Russia, Nigeria, and Brazil as well as Cuba, if it sees the end of its one-party system.” If Boko Haram is considered a mafia, then it did indeed get quite bad in Nigeria. Didn’t happen in the others though. Brazil is about as bad as ever. Report missed Mexico becoming a global center of organized crime. Cartel activity and the national murder rate shot up a few years after the report was published.

Globalization, nationalism and populism

“Some aspects of globalization—such as the growing global interconnectedness stemming from the information technology (IT) revolution— almost certainly will be irreversible. Yet it is also possible, although unlikely, that the process of globalization could be slowed or even stopped, just as the era of globalization in the late 19th and early 20th centuries was reversed by catastrophic war and global depression.” Globalization has definitely slowed. Consider Trump’s election, Brexit, growing resistance among Europeans to strengthening the E.U., the death of free trade deals like Doha, growing isolation and hostility of Russia.

“The transition will not be painless and will hit the middle classes of the developed world in particular, bringing more rapid job turnover and requiring professional retooling. Outsourcing on a large scale would strengthen the antiglobalization movement. Where these pressures lead will depend on how political leaders respond, how flexible labor markets become, and whether overall economic growth is sufficiently robust to absorb a growing number of displaced workers.” Yes, this is now a major political issue throughout the world. It’s unclear if the U.S. has permanently changed course or if Trump’s election just hit the Pause button on the U.S. outsourcing more jobs and importing more immigrant labor.

“Currently, about two-thirds of the world’s population live in countries that are connected to the global economy. Even by 2020, however, the benefits of globalization won’t be global. Over the next 15 years, gaps will widen between those countries benefiting from globalization—economically, technologically, and socially—and those underdeveloped nations or pockets within nations that are left behind. Indeed, we see the next 15 years as a period in which the perceptions of the contradictions and uncertainties of a globalized world come even more to the fore than is the case today.” Yes. Note the rise of populist, nationalist political parties and talking heads, and the new, near-constant focus on “inequality” in the press.

“What Could Derail Globalization?
The process of globalization, powerful as it is, could be substantially slowed or even stopped. Short of a major global conflict, which we regard as improbable, another large-scale development that we believe could stop globalization would be a pandemic…”

World economy

The report gives figures for “GNP,” but the metric is now known as “GNI.”

“Barring such a turn of events, the world economy is likely to continue growing impressively: by 2020, it is projected to be about 80 percent larger than it was in 2000, and average per capita income will be roughly 50 percent higher. Of course, there will be cyclical ups and downs and periodic financial or other crises, but this basic growth trajectory has powerful momentum behind it.” Missed the 2008 Great Recession, but then again, so did everybody. Regardless, the estimate was basically right. 2000 Gross world product (GWP) was $50 trillion while 2019 GWP was $87 trillion, meaning it grew 74% (note: figures are adjusted for inflation). The extra 6% growth we failed to achieve might owe to the Great Recession.

Technology

“The Internet in particular will spur the creation of even more global movements, which may emerge as a robust force in international affairs.” The Arab Spring was driven by young people with cell phones and social media. More generally, social media empowers people to organize and petition about all kinds of things, big and small, and to effectively pressure powerful people to do things.

“Moreover, future technology trends will be marked not only by accelerating
advancements in individual technologies but also by a force-multiplying convergence of the technologies—information, biological, materials, and nanotechnologies—that have the potential to revolutionize all dimensions of life. Materials enabled with nanotechnology’s sensors and facilitated by information technology will produce myriad devices that will enhance health and alter business practices and models. Such materials will provide new
knowledge about environment, improve security, and reduce privacy. Such interactions of these technology trends—coupled with agile manufacturing methods and equipment as well as energy, water, and transportation technologies—will help China’s and India’s prospects for joining the “First World.” Both countries are investing in basic research in these fields and are well placed to be leaders in a number of key fields. Europe risks slipping behind Asia in creating some of these technologies. The United States is still in a position to retain its overall lead, although it must increasingly compete with Asia and may lose significant ground in some sectors.” What are “nanotechnology’s sensors”? Can’t really assess the prediction without knowing what that means. The smartphone revolution happened after this was written, and the devices contain many sensors that “have nanotechnology.” Neither China nor India are in the First World yet, but the former has made major strides improving its technology and even taking the lead in some niches.

“New technology applications will foster dramatic improvements in human knowledge and individual well-being. Such benefits include medical breakthroughs that begin to cure or mitigate some common diseases and stretch lifespans, applications that improve food and potable water production, and expansion of wireless communications and language translation technologies that will facilitate transnational business, commercial, and even social and political relationships.” The predicted computer-related advances happened, but progress in medical technology has been disappointing. Over the last 16 years, we’ve discovered that biology is messier, more complex, and less amenable to manipulation than software.

“The media explosion cuts both ways: on the one hand, it makes it potentially harder to build a consensus because the media tends to magnify differences; on the other hand, the media can also facilitate discussions and consensus-building.” The first point has outweighed the other, and misinformation, disagreement, and social fragmentation have probably never been worse. The authors couldn’t have known.

“Growing connectivity also will be accompanied by the proliferation of transnational virtual communities of interest, a trend which may complicate the ability of state and global institutions to generate internal consensus and enforce decisions and could even challenge their authority and legitimacy. Groups based on common religious, cultural, ethnic or other affiliations may be torn between their national loyalties and other identities. The potential is considerable for such groups to drive national and even global political decisionmaking on a wide range of issues normally the purview of governments.” Accurate. It has made people more tribal and fragmented.

Misc.

“The likelihood of great power conflict escalating into total war in the next 15 years is lower than at any time in the past century, unlike during previous centuries when local conflicts sparked world wars.” Quite true. I think it will get slightly higher over the next 15 as China closes some of the military power gap with the U.S.

“Countries without nuclear weapons—especially in the Middle East and Northeast Asia—might decide to seek them as it becomes clear that their neighbors and regional rivals are doing so.” There have been no concrete steps in that direction. The U.S. has successfully assured Japan and South Korea they are under its nuclear umbrella, so they haven’t started their own nuclear programs in response to North Korea getting the bomb. Also, since Iran has been dissuaded/blocked from building nukes (this counter-effort was probably more successful than the report authors would have predicted), its neighbors haven’t tried building their own.

“Both North Korea and Iran probably will have an ICBM capability well before 2020” North Korea does; Iran does not.

“By 2020, China and Nigeria will have some of the largest Christian communities in the world, a shift that will reshape the traditionally Western-based Christian institutions, giving them more of an African or Asian or, more broadly, a developing world face.” I don’t think this happened.

“Over the next 15 years, democratic reform will remain slow and imperfect in many countries due to a host of social and economic problems, but it is highly unlikely that democracy will be challenged as the norm in Africa.” Was right.

“We foresee a more pervasive sense of insecurity, which may be as much based on psychological perceptions as physical threats, by 2020. The psychological aspects, which we have addressed earlier in this paper, include concerns over job security as well as fears revolving around migration among both host populations and migrants.” I wholeheartedly agree that a large share of today’s popular anxiety is psychological and not tangible in nature. Threats are commonly being exaggerated and even manufactured to keep average people fearful, tragically distracting them from the fact that this is the best time to be alive in human history for most types of people. The cause is a toxic nexus between the darker aspects of human nature and the profit-driven incentives of news media outlets.

July 30, 2019

“The Accidental Superpower” and my volcanic epiphany

I recently read The Accidental Superpower, and thought I’d write a brief review, as many of the book’s points align with the purpose of this blog. The first five chapters are great, and should be standard reading for anyone wanting a basic grasp of how accidents of natural geography help determine where nations form and what their fates are. Thanks to physics and to the demands of human biology, parts of the world with the following qualities are the best at supporting human populations:

Mild climates. Humans struggle to live in places that are too hot or too cold. This is why there was never a powerful civilization centered in the Arctic regions or Sahara desert. Only small numbers of hyper-specialized nomadic people were able to live in those harsh places, their constant struggle for survival meant they never had the spare time and resources to get advanced, and they were conquered by other groups of people who originated in neighboring temperate climate zones that could support larger populations and bigger resource surpluses.
Natural harbors and navigable waterways. Moving cargo by boat requires much less energy than it does to move it by pack animal, railroad, or truck. This means that parts of the world blessed with coastlines that have natural harbors–where ships could be protected from rough seas–could participate in trade and get richer than those that lacked them. Rivers are also very important because they provide drinking water, are convenient ways to get rid of waste, and can also be very cheap avenues of transportation, again bolstering trade. Importantly, not all rivers are created equal, and if they are too turbulent, shallow, or full of rapids, they aren’t useful for transit.
Flat land. Flat land is, for obvious reasons, more useful as farmland, and it is faster, easier, and cheaper for people and cargo to move across it. Flat land can be colonized quickly, and it can support a larger, richer population because of the higher agricultural potential and lower energy costs of moving people and cargo around (the less money you spend on moving things around, the more money you have left over for buying things you want). As mentioned, the most energy-efficient way to move cargo is by boat, but railroad trains are a respectable second-place, while moving things by automobile is a distant third. However, the energy-efficiency of railroad transportation sharply drops if a train has to go uphill even at a 1% grade, or if its track has a lot of curves in it. Thus, flat land is much more conducive to railroad networks.
Energy resources. Mostly, this means underground fossil fuel reserves.

There are three more key points worth mentioning:

Mountains (or “highlands” as the author calls them) are usually low-population zones because they can’t support much human life. They also block the flow of people, which can be a good thing (forms a natural barrier between your people and a neighboring group of foreign people) or a bad thing (impedes the movement of your people within your own country and naturally encourages them to develop cultural differences that might undermine shared national identity).
In general, the bigger a country’s population is, the stronger and richer it is. This is because most humans are productive assets that can build and invent things and aggregate into armies. However, important exceptions include humans that are very young, very old, or disabled. Those types of humans can’t do work, and are net drains on national resources. If they get to be too big a percentage of a country’s population, then the country will have all kinds of problems. The U.S. is one of the few major countries that has and will continue to have a favorable balance of productive humans vs. unproductive humans.
All of the advantages and disadvantages conferred by geography can be partly ameliorated with technology. Useless cerrados can be turned into farmland, artificial harbors can be built and turbid rivers dammed or dredged, railroad and road networks can be built in areas lacking navigable waterways, energy can be imported or derived from an increasingly diverse array of sources (e.g. – a small country lacking fossil fuels might be ideally situated for dams, nuclear power, solar power, or wind power), and tunnels can be bored through mountain ranges.

I’m much less of a fan of the second part of the book, where the author makes predictions about how different countries will fare up to 2040. He posits many indisputable facts that are well-known to any student of international affairs, geopolitics, and economics, but then leaps from those to many unfounded and provocative conclusions about what’s ahead. Here are those I strongly disagree with:

U.S./Canadian fossil fuels production will stay at high levels. The extent to which fracking has bolstered North American energy supplies, and by extension, changed the world’s energy market (oil and natural gas prices are low across the board now) is clear and remarkable. However, I don’t think it’s safe for the author to assume that U.S./Canadian production levels will stay at current levels until 2040. We don’t know how much recoverable shale oil and gas there is in North America, and production could level off as early as the mid-2020s, and then start declining a few years later.

Citi Bank has a good track record predicting fossil fuel markets, and they seem to forecast a plateau in U.S. shale oil production in the mid-2020s.

This scenario isn’t a certainty, and the author could be right, but it’s important to point out that a nearer-term peak is just as plausible as what he thinks. This is not just an academic issue; long-term North American energy independence and the ripple effect of low global fossil fuel prices underpin the author’s assumptions that the U.S. will have the economic luxury of disengaging from the world, particularly the Middle East.

The U.S. will disengage from the rest of the world, creating a destructive power vacuum. The author predicts that, once the U.S. becomes a net energy exporter, the infamous trade deficit with countries like China and Japan will shrink to the point that the U.S. could cut itself off from them at minimal economic cost. Advances in 3D printing (particularly metal printing) will also allow the U.S. to make its own goods instead of relying on foreign factories. Lacking any interest in affairs outside North America, the U.S. will withdraw from its military and trade alliances, bring all of its troops and ships home, and let high-seas pirates and undemocratic regional powers like Iran fill the vacuum.

Problematically, trends over the last five years since The Accidental Superpower‘s publishing haven’t gone the way the author predicted, which suggests the U.S. isn’t on track to being able to economically detach itself from the rest of the world. For example, even though the U.S. became the world’s #1 natural gas producer in 2013 and its #1 oil producer in 2018 and is now breaking all-time export records for both, the country;s trade deficit has gotten WORSE over that period.

A country has a “trade deficit” when the value of the things that it buys from other countries exceeds the value of the things that those countries buy from it. If your country has a trade deficit, then it means you can’t detach from the world economy without suffering serious pain.

Moreover, 3D printers have not improved to the extent that the author seems to have predicted, nor are they starting to replace traditional manufacturing machines (e.g. – looms, presses, lathes) in factories that mass produce goods. Furthermore, there’s no indication that this will change anytime soon. Looking back, it’s clear now that the author wrote the book during a period of hype about 3D printers, and that rosy predictions in pop-sci articles and financial magazines about how the machines were poised to revolutionize the manufacturing industry probably influenced his thinking.

3D printers failed to live up to the hype, at least in the short-run.

Additionally, since 2014, the U.S. has not become isolationist, in spite of the election of President Trump, whom many policy experts considered a “worst-case scenario” for continuing the U.S. foreign policy status quo. Putting aside the “America First” slogan and countless insulting Tweets aimed at foreign leaders and international alliances, Trump’s concrete policy changes have barely reduced the U.S.’ overseas commitments. Trump has (justifiably) berated other NATO countries for their low defense spending and has “hinted” that he might-possibly-be-thinking-about leaving the alliance, but no real steps have been taken to do so, like shutting down U.S. bases in Europe. Levels of American troops in places that are clearly not core U.S. interests, like Syria and Africa, have little changed since the “globalist” President Obama was in charge. U.S. defense spending is up, and there’s no sign that the military brass or a majority of U.S. politicians want to shrink it.

Where international trade policy is concerned, Trump’s impact has been more substantive as he has replaced NAFTA with a trade pact that favors the U.S. slightly more, refused to join the Trans-Pacific Partnership, and put tariffs on many Chinese imports. But all at worst these policies collectively put a tiny dent in the flow of U.S.-foreign trade.

Since 2014, there has simply been no sign of the U.S. retrenching for its then-existing global commitments, even in spite of the fact that the U.S. elected a more isolationist President in 2016 than the author (or most other experts) probably expected. I don’t think this will change, either, for several reasons. First, even if the U.S. doesn’t consume Middle Eastern oil, many other important countries do and will continue doing so. Allowing the Middle East’s petrostates to fall into chaos will disrupt oil supplies outside of North America, damaging economies across the world, and in turn reducing demand for U.S. exports to those countries. Thus, it will remain in the U.S.’ economic interest to stay engaged in the Middle East indefinitely, and to use its diplomatic and military power to protect the petrostates and Persian Gulf shipping lanes.

Second, the U.S. will stay diplomatically and militarily engaged in seemingly unimportant countries like Afghanistan and the Philippines to keep them from becoming terrorist bases and to prevent them from allying themselves with rivals like Russia or China. Remember that the 9/11 attacks cost the U.S. economy $200 billion at a minimum, and that the attacks were only made possible by al Qaeda having free reign in Afghanistan for bases and planning.

Third, as I hinted earlier, the U.S. military-industrial complex has taken on a life of its own, and pursues its own self-interests and protects its assets (including overseas bases) regardless of America’s actual defense needs. It has become the mother of all entrenched bureaucracies, it’s career suicide for any elected politician to propose serious cuts to it, and fixing military overspending and winding down foreign military alliances is not a priority for most American voters.

China will just, like, fall apart. Arguably the most extreme and least credible prediction in the book is that China will economically and politically implode due to internal and external pressures, it will stop being a world power, and will fragment along ethnolinguistic lines. While the author is right to note that China faces major challenges in the near-to-mid future, he makes elementary errors when he assumes they will lead to national calamity.

I don’t contend the author’s point that China has a corrupt, opaquely run banking sector, and that the country hundreds of billions of dollars in bad debts, but it’s impossible for anyone to know if it will lead to a financial crisis that will wreck the country’s economy. The author’s prediction primarily hinges on this unproven assumption, and is thus bad futurism. The author also rightly points out that China’s working-age population is shrinking due to the defunct One Child policy, and that this will exert serious drag on their economy as the number of unproductive elderly people continues increasing. But again, the author jumps to a conclusion when he predicts this will lead to economic collapse and widespread starvation in rural China. I think it’s much likelier that China’s economic growth rate will continue gradually slowing until it settles near the boundary between “middle” and “high” income countries over the next 20 years. How long it takes them to get out of the “Middle Income Trap” is an open question, but in the long run, they will.

The author’s prediction that the U.S. will help to bankrupt China by ending trade with it ignores the fact that this would be against American interests (the ongoing U.S.-China trade war notwithstanding), and his suggestion that Japan will rearm, magically stop caring about possible nuclear retaliation, and wage a ruinous war against China (along with India and perhaps other Asian countries joining in to block the sea lanes China uses to get oil from the Mideast) is completely silly. Moreover, the notion that China will splinter along ethnolinguistic lines like the Soviet Union did rests on badly flawed assumptions about the Chinese Communist Party’s willingness and ability to use force to put down internal rebellions. The recent 30th anniversary of the Tienanmen Square Massacre gives testimony to the opposite. There are no credible secessionist movements in China, and no rivals to the CCP’s grip on power, and both are unlikely to change.

And now for something completely different.

While reading The Accidental Superpower, I had the lucky…accident…of going on a trip to Ecuador, which is a country dominated by the Andes Mountain range. While there, I climbed a dormant volcano called “Mt. Pichincha,” which is on Quito’s outskirts. That experience in particular and the trip more generally hit home for me some of the book’s important points, and made me think about what they meant the future of intelligent life on Earth and beyond.

Quito sits in a valley that is 9,350 ft (2,850 meters) above sea level, which is already higher than the highest point in any U.S. state east of the Rocky mountains. Most foreigners can feel the tiring physical effects of the thinner air when they simply walk down the street in Quito. Hiking uphill at an even higher altitude is much worse, as I’d soon discover. The first step to climbing Mt. Pichincha is to take a gondola from the edge of the city to a point 12,943 ft (3,945 meters) up the mountain. After that, you walk on a trail to the summit, called “Rucu Pichincha”, 15,696 ft (4,784 meters) high.

Looking down at the city from the gondola station.

Right after exiting the gondola, I noticed it was several degrees colder than in the city, and low-hanging clouds blocked the sunlight. By contrast, Quito far below was mostly bathed in light, and I realized that Mt. Pichincha had its own climate distinct from the valley’s. I hiked out of the gondola station towards the summit, and after only about 20 minutes, passed the last tree along the trail. I was above the treeline, and the only vegetation was wild grass, bushes, and lichens.

Soon after that, I got to what you might call “the cloud line,” meaning I had hiked high enough to be inside that low-hanging cloud layer I noticed at the gondola station. The climate became harsher and more volatile, one minute being still, the next minute being almost clear, and the next being dark and windy. There were actually three distinct “sleet storms” during my hike (keep in mind this was in mid-July, and I was only a few miles from the equator!).

Being in such an environment hit home for me a key point made in The Accidental Superpower: mountains are barriers to human movement, and they form natural borders between human groups. During the first 99.8% of our species’ existence, before Industrial-era technology existed, mountains like Pichincha would have been nearly impassable and almost uninhabitable. Merely building a shelter to escape the harsh climate would have been hard thanks to the lack of wood (remember, I quickly got above the treeline during the hike). Stones would need to be used, which imposes various inefficiencies. Even the crucial ability to make fire for warmth or for cooking would be handicapped by the lack of wood and the moist atmosphere.

If you want an otherworldly experience, explore a large abandoned building, hike a mountain above the treeline, or do hallucinogenic drugs.

The low temperatures (it got bitingly cold and my hands went numb at one point), low sunlight, rocky soil, and sloped land would have made farming impossible. Hunting and gathering on Mt. Pichincha wouldn’t have worked since the animals were so few (I only saw a few small birds and one rabbit) and the vegetation so sparse–the calories you’d burn chasing down animals and walking around to find edible plants would probably exceed the calories you’d get from eating them. Growing food in the arable land in the Quito valley and then shipping it up the mountain on mules or wagons to feed people living there would doubtless be too expensive (unless the mountain people had something really valuable to trade for food, like gold they were getting from a mine), and would ultimately be limited by the same “balance of calories burned vs. obtained” phenomenon. As I realized during my climb, you burn a lot of calories when walking uphill.

The only way a permanent human settlement might have been able to feed itself on Mt. Pichincha would have been if it had domesticated mountain goats or maybe llamas and alpacas (it depends on how sure-footed they are on steep slopes). They could have grazed on the wild grasses and bushes. Even still, I doubt there would have been enough vegetation to support anything but small herds of the animals, which in turn would have kept the number of humans living on the mountain small. The comparatively fertile and benign environment in the Quito valley would have inevitably come to support a much larger, richer population. Imagining a topographical map of the world in my mind’s eye with this new knowledge, many patterns of human settlement and many national boundaries suddenly made more sense to me.

In the town of Da Lat, Vietnam, several hills have been terraced and covered with greenhouses.

As I hiked further, I considered another important point from The Accidental Superpower–technology allows humans to overcome problems imposed by geography–and I thought about how modern technology could make Mt. Pichincha habitable. Paved roads could be built on all but the steepest parts of the mountain, making most points on it accessible to humans from Quito without physical exertion (the gondola could also be extended). The sloped land could be leveled, graded, and terraced in order to build structures above it, where humans could live and work. Greenhouses could be built on the flattened land, and crops grown inside with much greater efficiency than they would grow outside, particularly if the greenhouses contained transplanted soil and used artificial lighting to counter the mountain’s cloudiness. Water supplies could be assured by building a system of rain catchments and cisterns, and by building simple devices that condensed cloud vapor into water. People living on the mountain could produce some of their own food, though it would be cheaper to buy it from a more fertile place and have it shipped up.

Likewise, people living on Mt. Pichincha could generate their own energy, or build power lines to Quito and buy it from them. As noted, the mountain was windy most of the time, so wind turbines would be an efficient power source. And since Pichincha is a dormant volcano, there are good odds that a geothermal power plant could by sited there.

The only real barriers to building towns or even cities at high altitudes like Mt. Pichincha are cost of living and quality of life. Most things would cost more money since they would be scarcer or would have to be trucked in from Quito. The mountain’s harsh and volatile climate would also be repellent to most humans, though the fact the people still willingly live in Iceland and northern Alaska proves that some people could take it. And even at the peak of Mt. Pichincha, 15,696 ft high, the air is thick enough for humans to breathe without difficulty after a few months of acclimatization. In fact, the highest human town is in neighboring Peru and is 1,000 ft higher than Pichincha’s summit, and professional mountaineers have found that the air remains thick enough for humans to breathe up to 26,247 ft (8,000 m). Thus, modern technology has overcome the natural impediments to human settlement on anything but the world’s very tallest mountains.

One of Facebook’s massive data centers is in Sweden, close to the Arctic Circle. It was sited there partly because the cold temperatures can cool the servers.

I kept hiking, and in spite of worsening physical exhaustion and the thinning air, I had more insights. What would even more advanced technologies mean for the habitability of Mt. Pichincha and other desolate places in the future? Extending the logic from The Accidental Superpower, it would stand to reason that they would open even more to settlement, especially if the settlement were being done by intelligent machines that didn’t have the same biological limitations and inbuilt preferences as humans like us. The colder, windy climate would actually be beneficial since it would help the AIs to cool their computer chips. The thinness of the air and poor quality of the soil wouldn’t pose problems since machines don’t breathe or eat. The bleakness of the landscape wouldn’t bother machines since they would lack the inbuilt genetic programming that humans have, which makes us crave sunny, green environments and blue skies.

All that AIs would need to survive on Mt. Pichincha would be electricity, building materials, and roads to get up and down the mountain. As I noted earlier, the electricity problem could be solved easily, there’s no engineering reason why roads couldn’t be built on all but the steepest parts of the mountain, and building materials could be shipped in from Quito, or even made by pulverizing some of the stones comprising the mountain itself and turning them into concrete. Intelligent machines could probably thrive there. And if they had radically advanced technologies like fusion power and nanomachine-based replicators, they’d have no need for anything aside from periodic refills of fusion reactor fuel and small amounts of trace elements they couldn’t extract from the mountain’s soil or from the air.

Additionally, it struck me that living on Mt. Pichincha or another remote, inhospitable place would be an ethical choice for intelligent machines since their presence wouldn’t displace any humans, and since constructing server farms and structures wouldn’t destroy much animal or plant life. As I noted, I only saw a handful of small animals during my hike, and few of the plants were higher than my knees. Perhaps it will be the fate of intelligent machines to build their cities on mountaintops, cold deserts, or floating on the seas.

And extending this train of thinking by assuming ever-better technology and intelligent machines moving to ever-more-remote places, we are inevitably led to the prospect of space colonization, von Neumann probes, and the conversion of whole celestial bodies into computronium, as Ray Kurzweil predicts (and maybe in the very far future, if our understanding of Physics evolves, our civilization might find ways to “live” in the very fabric of space-time and be invisible but everywhere, or to expand beyond our universe). The well-established point in The Accidental Superpower that technology allows humans to overcome problems imposed by geography and to spread to formerly inhospitable parts of the world (e.g. – Florida before air conditioning was invented) has major implications for the future, and buttresses ideas about space colonization that are now the purview of science fiction. The rule should be rephrased as: Technology allows intelligent life forms to overcome problems imposed by geography and to spread to formerly inhospitable places.

Right as I was making this wonderful conceptual breakthrough, I got so dizzy from the effects of thin air and physical exertion that I fell on my face. Fortunately, I was wearing my backpack around the front of my body like a weirdo, so it cushioned the impact, and I was unhurt. I took stock of my condition and my surroundings: the trail had become narrow and treacherous (the segment I was on was named “Paso de la Muerte” or “Step of the Dead”), I couldn’t see far because I was enveloped in the clouds, and stumbling to the right thanks to another loss of balance or a strong gust of wind would have meant rolling far down a nearly vertical cliff. No, I was not prepared for this climb, so I turned back about 30 minutes short of reaching the summit of Rucu Pichincha. Yes, it was a bit disappointed, but I didn’t want to die, and I consoled myself with my new bit of knowledge and with the fact that I’d managed to hike to about 14,500 ft, which, other than the times I’ve flown in airplanes, is the highest I’ve been in my life.

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